This section calculates the impact of formalizing Syrian employees for their employers, the Social
\nSecurity Institute (SSI), the Treasury and the employees themselves. This research is carried out
\nwith the aim of bringing all economic actors under the spotlight since, as Bangasser (2000) lucidly
\npointed out, it is often \u2018… much safer to help those suffering from informality than to confront those
\nbenefiting from it\u2019. In this respect we find that Turkey-based employers may be saving 8,171 millions
\na year at the expense of the SSI and those employed without a work permit. At the same time, the
\nSSI is not only deprived of an income flow estimated in 7,060 millions per year but is also required
\nto provide health care services to Syrian refugees who belong to the Temporary Protection regime,
\nputting pressure on the institution and endangering its sustainability.
\nThe importance of providing work permits to informal Syrian employees goes beyond social security
\ncontributions gone astray; it is related to the provision of decent work, including access to health care,
\nto a pension after retirement as well other labour rights provisioned by the law. In spite of the
\nimportance of providing formal work arrangements, only 27,93047 temporary protection beneficiaries
\nhad received a work permit by September 2018, a figure that anticipates a long and arduous path
\nahead in the quest for formalizing this group of employees.
\nSome measures aimed at facilitating the work permit application process have already been put
\nin place by the government; these include online processing of application forms, the provision of an
\n46This number is calculated by adding up the differences between the DGMM and our own (based on the 2017 HLFS,
\nsee Appendix C) estimates on the number of Syrian refugees in the sub-regions that gained population.
\n47Source: http:\/\/www.asylumineurope.org\/reports\/country\/turkey\/access-labour-market-0.
\n35
\nSyrian refugees in the Turkish Labour Market
\nstep-by-step guide designed to walk employers through the process and a dramatic reduction in the
\napplication fee from 761.1 to 283.248 for a 1 year work permit as of 2019. Still, existing restrictions
\nrelated to eligibility may be dramatically reducing the number of Syrian refugees who could obtain
\na work permit. Two of these restrictions, the 10 per cent employment quota and the obligation to
\nwork in the same province where the person was initially registered, might, in practice, discard 68.4
\nper cent of the informal Syrian employees from receiving a work permit. In addition, Syrian refugees\u2019
\nguaranteed access to health services and uncertainty with respect to their future living arrangements
\nmay lower their incentives to demand their formalization, thus delaying the conversion even further.
\nIn light of the poor conversion rate to formality of Syrian employees, and with the objective of
\nproviding decent work for all as well as supporting the SSI\u2019s operations, some additional measures
\nmight be due. At a minimum, effective guidance should be developed for Syrian workers. Social
\nsecurity rights and obligations should be well explained and information activities should be organized
\nwithin this scope. One direction that could be explored is the relaxation of the employment quota
\nfor those under the temporary protection regime, which currently is even more stringent than the
\none applied to other migrants. Another dimension that could be further studied is the removal of
\nthe mobility restrictions, especially in view of the limited success it has had in preventing internal
\nmigrations for job search purposes. In addition to the measures directed at enlarging the pool of
\neligible applicants, some policies aimed at increasing the incentives of Syrian refugees to demand their
\nformalization can also be used. One such policy could offer a lump-sum with a share of the social
\nsecurity contributions to returning refugees. This would not only increase the demand of work permits
\nbut would also facilitate the return and re-integration of Syrian refugees in their country of origin<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
This section calculates the impact of formalizing Syrian employees for their employers, the Social Security Institute (SSI), the Treasury and the employees themselves. This research is carried out with the aim of bringing all economic actors under the spotlight since, as Bangasser (2000) lucidly pointed out, it is often \u2018… much safer to help those […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-617","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"yoast_head":"\n